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2. Policymaking and the Unification of Financial Supervision 
 
Our starting point is the blurring effect that is taking place in the banking and financial 
industry6. There has been increasing integration of the banking, securities and insurance markets, as 
well as their respective products and instruments. The blurring effect causes two interdependent 
phenomena: 1) the emergence of financial conglomerates7, which is likely to produce important 
changes in the nature and dimensions of the individual intermediaries, as well as in the degree of 
unification of the banking and financial industry; and 2) growing securitisation of the traditional 
forms of banking activity and the proliferation of sophisticated ways of bundling, repackaging and 
trading risks, which weaken the classic distinction between equity, debt and loans8, bringing 
changes in the nature and dimensions of the financial markets. 
The blurring process proposes different questions in the debate on financial supervision 
architecture, but the most important one is the alternative between the single authority model and 
the financial multi - authority model9. Identifying the optimal supervisory regime between the two 
alternatives is an interesting problem. 
It has been correctly claimed that no “superior” model of supervision exists10. The quest for 
the optimal supervision architecture cannot be pursued through a simple traditional analysis of the 
costs and benefits expected from the possible alternative structures. If, in fact, one proposes to 
compare the two models, he realizes that each of them offers expected benefits but also expected 
risks11. So a theoretical analysis of the potential effects of alternative supervisory structures does not 
take us very far. 
                                                 
6See Dale (1997) and White (1997). 
7See European Commission (2002) and de Luna Martinez and Rose (2003). 
8De Luna Martinez and Rose (2003). 
9See Masciandaro (2004). 
10Briault (2002), Schoenmaker (2003). 
11For a survey see Masciandaro and Porta (2004). 
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Actually, gains and losses of a supervisory model are expected variables, calculated by the 
policymakers that maintain or reform the supervisory regime. But the expectations of policymakers, 
given their own specific goals, are likely to be influenced by structural economic and institutional 
variables, which may vary from country to country. Therefore the supervisory regime is not 
deterministic, nor, on the other side, completely accidental. 
On the contrary, given the national economic and institutional endowment, these variables can 
determine, ceteris paribus, the policymakers’ expected gains or losses of a specific supervisory 
regime. The supervisory regime can become the dependent variable, in a path dependence 
framework. Furthermore, the economic agents have not information on the true preferences of the 
policymaker: his optimal degree of financial supervision unification is a hidden variable. 
In the economic literature there are not yet theoretical studies that consider the policymaker 
objective function for the financial supervisory design12. The crucial issue is the identification of 
the policymaker preferences. 
 The first approach to identify the policymaker’s function could be the so called narrative 
approach13, in which official documents are interpreted to gauge the policymaker choices. This 
approach has the drawback that there is substantial room for differences between the policymaker 
announcements and his true preferences. 
 The second approach - which we intend to follow here - is to consider the policymaker 
actual choices in determining the level of financial supervision unification (factual approach). In 
each random point of time, we observe the policymaker decision to maintain or reform the 
                                                 
12The problem could be analysed as a model of political delegation, trying to apply in the financial supervisory field the 
general framework proposed in Alesina and Tabellini (2003). The delegation approach has been recently used to 
debate financial supervisory issues in Bjerre- Nielsen (2004) and in Eisenbeis (2004). There are two theoretical 
model on the banking supervision architecture – Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2004) - but without any 
explicit identification and discussion of the policymaker (lawmaker) objective function. 
13The narrative approach has been extensively used in the monetary policy literature: see Potts and Luckett (1978), 
Wallace and Warner (1985), Hakes (1988) and (1990), Romer and Romer (1989). 
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financial supervision architecture, choosing the level of unification. In other words we consider 
policymakers faced with discrete choices.  
 Building in a cross country perspective an empirical analysis consistent with this discrete 
choice process involves claiming the existence of unobservable policymaker utilities Uij, where 
each Uij is the utility received by the ith national policymaker from the jth level of financial 
unification. Since the utility Uij is unobservable, we represent it as a random quantity, assuming 
that is composed of a systematic part U and a random error term ε. Furthermore, we claim that the 
utilities Uij are function of the attributes of the alternative institutional level of financial 
unification and of the structural characteristics of the policymaker country.  
Combining the two hypotheses, we have a random utility framework for the unobservable 
financial unification variable. As usual, we assume that the errors εij are independent for each 
national policymaker and institutional alternative, normally distributed. The independence 
assumption implies that the utility derived by one national policymaker is not related to the utility 
derived by any other national policymaker, and that the utility that a policymaker derives from the 
choice of a given level of financial unification is not related to the utility provided by the other 
alternative14.  
 In the factual approach the first crucial issue is the measurement of the policymaker 
choices, that is the definition of the dependent variable15. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14See Maddala (1983), Greene (1997) and Wooldrige (2002) for in-depth discussion on the random utility models that 
generate discrete dependent variables. 
15The factual approach has the drawback that there is subjectivity in the institutional measurements. However the 
subjectivity in the interpretation is also present in the narrative approach.  
